Cloud storage is an important service of cloud computing, it can offer services for data owners in a pay-as-you-go fashion. In cloud storage, after data files are outsourced, data owner no longer has physical controls over the storage. To protect the outsourced data in cloud storage against corruptions, several public auditing schemes for data integrity checking were proposed to achieve data integrity checking. The existing auditing schemes make the auditor execute high computation to check data integrity. It might become a burden for a lot of data owner. To solve the above problem, we propose a novel public auditing scheme with public verifiability and constant communication cost based on self-certified signature scheme in this paper. Thorough analysis shows that our proposed scheme is secure and efficient. The security of our scheme is based on the fixed inversion (FI) problem of the bilinear map and the inversion of hash function. Finally, based on the above protocol, we extend it into multi-user setting.
Introduction
At present, as a new computing paradigm, cloud storage is now gaining popularity because it offers a flexible on-demand data outsourcing service with appealing benefits: relief of the burden for storage management, universal data access with location independence, and avoidance of capital expenditure on hardware, software, and personal maintenances, etc. (Liu et al., 2015) , In terms of applications, cloud services are divided into three categories: infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS), platform-as-a-service (PaaS) and software-as-a-service (SaaS). Cloud computing has been well developed for various services for some applications such as cloud storage services, virtual machines, database servers, etc. Many international IT corporations now offer powerful public cloud storage services for users; examples are Amazon AWS, Google Cloud Storage, Dropbox and Apple's iCloud.
In a variety of cloud services, cloud storage is the most popular application service. Because it can provide various elastic and scalable services in a pay-as-you-go fashion, it has become a trend that individuals and IT enterprises store data remotely to the cloud in a flexible on-demand manner, which has become a popular way of data outsourcing. It can reduce the burden for storage management and maintenances and cost on hardware and software for users and conveniently access the outsourcing data in the cloud. In fact, cloud storage increasingly becomes one of the major services in cloud computing where user data are stored and maintained by cloud servers. It allows data user to access their data via internet at anytime, from anywhere and in any format.
Despite the increasing momentum of cloud storage service, promising as it is, it also brings forth new challenges for data security and privacy since the data owner no longer physical controls over the storage sites after the data is outsourced to the cloud. Data security and privacy problem are the major threats in cloud storage. Sometimes, cloud service providers might be dishonest. They could discard the data that have not been accessed or rarely accessed to save the storage space and claim that the data are still correctly stored in the cloud. Thus, for the user, the most concern issues are data integrity and data confidentiality. Namely, whether the outsourced data is modified, deleted, and lost, and whether the sensitive data is revealed. Although cloud server may claim that they have designed a series of security protections for these data storage services, casting the image of a more reliable and secure place to store data than personal devices, the integrity of the outsourced data in the cloud may still be in doubt due to the existence of hardware/software failures and human errors. However, recently, a number of data leakage events have been reported for famous storage services providers (Amazon, 2001; Amazon Web Service, 2007; Business Insider, 2000; Dropbox, 2010) , including Google cloud, Amazon S3 and Dropbox. It makes that the users have to concerned about the security of their data.
To ensure the integrity of the remote data in the untrusted cloud, many integrity checking mechanisms have been proposed. As for verification way of data integrity, it is divided into public verification and private verification. Juels and Kaliski (1999) proposed proof-of-retrievability (AUDITING) system, it allows storage server to convince a client that it can correctly retrieve a file previously stored at the cloud server. However, the communication cost in the scheme is linear with the number of elements in the coded file block. In the same conference, to the same purpose, Ateniese et al. (2007) proposed provable data possession model (PDP) using homomorphic authentication tag to realise the integrity check of the remote data. To increase efficiency of Shacham and Waters (2008) POR scheme, Shacham and Waters proposed two POR schemes based on the homomorphic linear authenticators, one supported private POR verification and the other supported public POR verification. Although the two proposed schemes can offer fast verification, their communication cost still grow linearly with the number of elements in the data block. To enhanced the Shacham and Waters' (2008) schemes, the size of the challenge message is reduced, but the length of proof response is still linear with the number of elements in the data block. To further improve Shacham and Waters' (2008) schemes, Xu et al. put forth a POR scheme with constant communication cost by utilising polynomial commitment technique. However, their scheme only supports private verification and requires data owner to stay online and to perform all the verification tasks for the client.
To construct a public verification POR scheme with constant communication cost, Yuan and Yu (2013) proposed a public verifiability POR scheme with constant communication cost based on constant size polynomial commitment and homomorphic linear authenticators. In fact, their scheme is insecure and data owner needs to execute high computation for the outsourcing data. In Timothy and Peter (2011) , the author put forth a new auditing scheme, however, the auditing cost is linear with the group size and data size. In order to further enhance the previous works, another attempt was made by Yuan and Yu (2013) . However, Yuan and Yu (2013) still suffers from a non-trivial computational cost which is linear with the challenged size and the number of checking tasks, and thus is limited in scalability. To our best knowledge, there still lacks an efficient and publicly verifiable integrity checking scheme for cloud data sharing that supports constant verification.
To increase efficiency and resist security attack, we propose a novel AUDITING scheme with public verification based on self-certified signature in the paper. The scheme can efficiently resist data leakage and active attack. Our main contributions have three-fold:
1 the scheme has constant communication cost and public verification in the data integrity checking 2 the scheme reduces the computation cost of producing data authentication tag before the outsourcing data 3 the security of our scheme is based on the fixed inversion (FI) problem of the bilinear map and the inversion of hash function.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we review the preliminaries of our work; Section 3 describes the system model, security model and goals; in Section 4, our scheme is proposed. The corresponding security proof of our scheme in Section 5. We give performance analysis of our scheme in Section 6. We conclude the paper in Section 7.
Preliminaries

Bilinear maps
Let G 1 and G 2 be two multiplicative cyclic groups of the same prime order q, g be a generator of group G 1 . A bilinear map e :
ab . And there exists a computable algorithm that can efficiently compute e and e(g, g) ̸ = 1.
Mathematics problems
1 as input, for any probabilistic polynomial time adversary Adv CDH , it is computational infeasible to output g ab , which is defined as
as input, for any probabilistic polynomial time adversary Adv DL , it is computational infeasible for it to compute a, which is defined as
• The knowledge-of-exponent assumption 1 (KEA1) (Bellare and Palacio, 2004) . For any adversary A which takes inputs (q, g, g a ) and returns (C, Y ) with Y = C a , there exists an extractor B, which given the same inputs as A returns c such that g c = C.
Model and goals
System model
In the work, the system model consists of four entities: the trust authority, data owner,the verifier and the cloud server. It is shown as Figure 1 . The trust authority is responsible to issue witness for each data owner. Data owner has a number of data and uploads them to the cloud server after erasure coding together with the corresponding signatures on these data. The cloud server stores these data for the client and provides download service if data owner requires. Because there exists hardware/software failures and internal attack in the cloud, data owner do not full trust the cloud. The verifier is able to execute the integrity checking of the outsourced data on behalf of the data owner. To execute the integrity checking of data, the verifier needs to produce a challenging message and sends it to the cloud server. Here, we assume the cloud server are always equipped with powerful computing capacity, data owner and the verifier have only constrained computational power or bandwidth.
Figure 1
The system model of data integrity checking (see online version for colours)
Security model
In our AUDITING scheme, the adversary is divided into two types: insider attacker and outsider attacker. For the outsider attacker, it can corrupt the stored data on the cloud server. In our model, the cloud server is considered to be untrusted and potentially malicious. Thus, it is an insider attacker which may delete or modify the stored data for its own interests. Complying with the definition in Juels and Kaliski (1999), Shacham and Waters (2008) and Ma et al. (2013) , we define the security game for the soundness of our AUDITING scheme as below.
Definition 1: Let Γ = (SystemInit, KeyGen, T agGen, T agV er − Challenging, P rove, V erif y) be a AUDITING scheme and A be a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary. The following security game among a trust authority, a challenger and the adversary A is defined as follows:
• The trust authority runs SystemInit(1 λ ) → P aram, then it runs KeyGen(1 λ , P aram) → (pk, sk), and sends (P aram, pk) to the adversary A.
• The adversary A chooses a data file M and sends it to data owner. Data owner runs T agGen(M, sk, pk) → (δ,M ) and responds the encoded data fileM and the corresponding authentication tag δ to the adversary A.
• After receiving the tag (δ,M ) of data M , it first verifies whether the tag (δ,M ) is valid or not. If it is valid, then the adversary accepts it; otherwise, it outputs 0 and requests to renewedly compute the tag.
• For the data file M chosen by the adversary A, the challenger produces a challenging information Chall by randomly choosing a subset I and returns it to the adversary A.
• Based on the received challenging information Chall, the adversary A produces a data fileM ′ by modifying or deleting the part ofM . And it makes a proof response P rf by running an arbitrary algorithm Art(M ′ , δ, pk) → P rf rather than Prove algorithm. Finally, it sent back this proof response P rf to the challenger.
• Upon receiving the proof response P rf , the challenger verifies P rf by running V erif y algorithm with P rf and pk. Then it outputs Rst ← V erif y(P rf, pk).
• The adversary wins the above game if and only if it can produce a P rf on the data fileM ′ ,M ′ ̸ =M and make that the challenger accepts Rst by the Verifying algorithm.
We say that Γ is secure if for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, it is negligible to win the above game.
Goals
To securely and efficiently to check the integrity of the outsourced data in the cloud, a AUDITING scheme should satisfy the following properties:
• efficiency: in terms of communication cost and computational complexity, the verifier should execute the integrity checking of the outsourced data in the cloud with as little as possible or constant computational cost and communication cost
• unforgeability: any adversary cannot forge proof information to pass the verification algorithm by modifying or deleting data
• soundness: if the data is corrupted, the cloud server is able to produce a valid integrity proof information
• data privacy: any one cannot obtain any information which is relevant to the outsourced data in the process of data integrity verification except the cloud and data owner.
Self-certified public auditing of data integrity
In this section, we will give a self-certified public auditing scheme for data integrity. Then we briefly evaluate its performance in term of basic cryptographic operations and provides intuition behind the construction. In a public auditing scheme for data integrity, after data owner outsourced data to the cloud server, it deletes the local copy of these data. A verifier can periodically check the data integrity, note the verifier is the auditor in this paper. To check the integrity of data files, the auditor needs to produce a challenging sampling set I and sends I to the cloud server. According to the sampling set I, the cloud server responds the proof information for the chosen data blocks to the verifier. After receiving the proof information, the auditor can verify the integrity of data files through the verification algorithm. Based on the above idea, we adopt a self-certified-based digital signature scheme which was proposed by Ma et al. (2013) to construct our public auditing scheme for data integrity.
System initialisation
Given a security parameter 1 k , the trusted authority (TA) party sets up the system parameters as follows. Let G 1 and G T be two multiplicative cyclic groups of the same prime order q. g 1 , h 1 ∈ G 1 are two generators of group G 1 . Let e : G 1 × G 1 → G T be a bilinear pairing map. TA randomly chooses α ∈ Z * q to compute M P K = g α 1 and sets (msk = α, M P K) as his key pair. In addition, TA also chooses two collision-resistant cryptographic hash functions H 1 : {0, 1} * → G 1 , and H 2 : {0, 1} * → Z q . Finally, publish the system parameters
KeyGen
Assume that O denotes the data owner. Data owner O randomly chooses a x ∈ Z q as his private key sk v and computes the corresponding public key pk v = e (g 1 , g 1 ) x .
WitReg
Let ID o be the identifier of data owner O, to produce a witness, data owner interacts with TA by the following steps:
1 Data owner computes a zero-knowledge proof ZKP 0 of private key 
Tag generation
Let M denote a data file which will be stored in the cloud, where M is a coded data file, such as applying Reed-Solomon code. It is divided into n data blocks, data file M can be presented as
To produce an authentication tag data block m i 1 ≤ i ≤ n, data owner O computes as follows: 1 it randomly chooses r i ∈ Z q to compute
The data owner stores data file M , and the corresponding authentication tags σ i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n on the cloud storage server.
Challenging
To audit the integrity of the stored data file M in the cloud, a public auditor produces the challenge message:
2 Then it picks a number r ∈ Z q at random. And send (K, r) to the cloud storage server. Note that (K, r) must be different in each auditing.
Proving
Upon receiving the challenging message (K, r), the cloud server computes
Then, the cloud storage server computes a proof of data file M 's possession by the following steps:
1 it computes
3 finally, return the proof information P rf = (U, T ) to public verifier.
Verifying
On receiving the proof information P rf , the public auditor executes the integrity of data file with proof information P rf as:
1 firstly, parses P rf into U and T
then, it computes
where W o is a witness of data owner and known for the auditor.
If the above equation holds, then the public auditor thinks that the integrity of data file M is correct; otherwise, it does not.
Correctness:
In the following, we show that our construction is correct, since
Security analysis
In this section, we will analyse the security of the proposed public auditing scheme and show that our scheme is secure in the random oracle model.
Lemma1:
For an untrusted cloud storage server, it is computationally infeasible to produce an authentication tag on message block.
Proof: our scheme is based on Li et al. (2012) self-certified digital signature scheme. If the untrusted cloud storage server can produce an authentication on message block m ′ i , it means that this untrusted cloud server can forge a self-certified signature on message m ′ i . However, Li et al.'s self-certified digital signature scheme is proven secure under the k + 1 exponent problem and discrete logarithm problem. It guarantees that the untrusted cloud server cannot produce a valid authentication tag on message block, thus, it resists tampering of message block.
Lemma 2:
If there exists a probabilistic polynomial time adversary A that can pass the verification in our scheme with a forged proof information P rf ′ , then we can construct an algorithm B which is able to solve the FI problem of the bilinear map and the inversion of hash function by invoking this adversary A.
Proof: We assume that there exists a PPT adversary A who can forge a proof information P rf = (T, U ) which can pass auditing verification, then we can construct a PPT algorithm B to break FI problem of the bilinear map by using the adversary A.
According to the existing attacks, the forged proof information P rf ′ = (U, T ) has two types.
The one type is P rf ′ ̸ = P rf , and P rf ′ is a forged proof information on message blocks (m i1 , m i2 , · · · , m ik ), where P rf ia a honest proof information on message
The other type is P rf ′ = P rf , and P rf ′ is a forged proof information on message 
2 We know it is valid authentication tag if k i = 0, otherwise, it is invalid.
3 Then, it sets
To show the detail security proof, let us review the FI problem of bilinear map, for a fixed g 1 ∈ G 1 and any given h ∈ G T , its goal is to find an inverse image g ′ such that e(g ′ , g 1 ) = h. Let pk o = h ∈ G T be public key of data owner with identifier ID o , and g 1 be a generator of group G 1 , where h = e(g 1 , g x 1 ), but x is an unknown number.
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Suppose that a probabilistic polynomial time adversity A can produce a proof information P rf ′ = (U ′ , T ′ ) which can pass the public auditing verification of the verifier, where (U ′ , T ′ ) ̸ = (U, T ) and P rf = (U, T ). Then we have the following two equations
Dividing equation (1) with equation (2), we obtain
Here, we will make a case analysis for forged proof information P rf ′ .
Case 1:
, according to equation (3), we have the following relation:
Thus, we can obtain
It means that algorithm B can find an element (
Case 2: When T = T ′ , The other type is P rf ′ = P rf , and P rf ′ is a forged proof information on message blocks (m' i1 , m' i2 , · · · , m' ik ), where at lease one m' ij ̸ = m ij for j ∈ K. The detail forgery is as follow:
According to the above computation of T , we have the following equations:
By the above equations (4) and (5), we can know
It means that given
, an attacker can find a m ′ i which satisfies
Obviously, it is in contradiction with the difficulty of solving the inversion of hash function.
Performance analysis
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme in terms of communication overhead, computational cost and storage cost as well as security by comparing our scheme scheme with existing AUDITING techniques (Dodis et al., 2004; Jia and Ee-Chien, 2012; Shacham and Waters, 2008; Yuan and Yu, 2013) . For clear demonstration, we use C M U L to denote the complexity of one multiplication operation on group G 1 , C EXP 1 to be that of one exponentiation operation on group G 1 , C e be a pairing operator which is most time-consuming. Furthermore, we use C ADD and C M to denote the addition and multiplication operations on Z q respectively. Let PRF denote pseudorandom function, |F | be the size of the encoded data file, λ be a security parameter, and |G| be the length of a group element on G.
From Figure 2 , we know that our scheme has the advantages over the other schemes in terms of communication cost, computational cost, and data preparation as well as security. As shown in Table 1 , the total computational cost for the challenger in the verification is only 2C Exp + 2C e . Thus, it is very suitable to the resource-constraint devices.
In a data integrity checking in cloud storage, data owner's computation is an important indicator. In our scheme, computational complexity of data owner can be determined by the number of producing authentication tags for data block. For a constant size data file F , the number of data block is computed by the equation
where size of (m block ) denotes the length of each data block. When we consider the time of producing a tag for one data block, it is easy to see that the computational time can be denoted as
The other computation operators can be neglected due to lower computation. Thus, the total tag generation time for a constant size of data M can be computed as
According to the above equation (6), we know the size of data block has influences on computation time of data owner. Figure 3 shows the total computation time of generating all the data tags for 1 MByte data component versus the size of each data block.
Self-certified auditing with supporting multi-user
The above protocol only supports simple user's data integrity checking. However, in real life, an auditor cannot only provide service individual-by-individual since it will increase the auditor's burden. Thus, we hope that a public auditing protocol can simultaneously support multi-user's data integrity checking. Based on the above protocol, a self-certified auditing with supporting multi-user is given as follows. For system initialisation, KeyGen, WitReg, Tag Generation, they are similar to those in the above protocol. Here, we only consider Challenging, Proving and verifying. 
Exp Notes: n is number of encoded blocks for the data file, s is the number of elements in each block and l is number of blocks selected for verification. Note that given a system security parameter the values of λ and |G| are fixed. The comparison result is shown in Table 1 .
Challenging
Let n u denote the number of the users, to audit the integrity of the stored data files
of n u users in the cloud, a public auditor produces the challenge message:
2 Then it picks a number r ∈ Z q at random. And send (K, r) and the file index (index 1 , · · · , index nu ) of n u users to the cloud storage server. Note that (K, r) must be different in each auditing.
Proving
Upon receiving the challenging message (K, r) and the file index (index 1 , · · · , index nu ), the cloud server computes
Then, the cloud storage server computes the corresponding proof of data files (M 1 , · · · , M nu ) possession by the following steps:
For j = 1 to n u 1 it computes
2 then, compute
Next, it computes
Finally, return the proof information P rf = (U, T 1 , T 2 , · · · , T nu ) to public verifier.
Verifying
On receiving the proof information P rf , the public auditor executes the integrity of data files with proof information P rf as:
1 firstly, parses P rf into U and (T 1 , T 2 , · · · , T nu ) 2 then, it computes L = ∑ i∈K p k 3 next, it checks where W jo is a witness of data owner j and known for the auditor.
If the above equation holds, then the public auditor thinks that the integrity of all data files are correct; otherwise, they do not.
Conclusions
Cloud storage is more and more attractive because it can realise the sharing and storing of data files among companies and corporations. However, for the data owner, the most concern is the integrity of data file. Fortunately, proofs of retrievability technique enables the data owners verify the integrity of their outsourced data on the cloud server. However, most of the existing POR schemes still exist efficiency and security flaws, for example,the communication cost is linear with the number of elements in a data block, or the public verifiability is not supported. To overcome the above problems, in this work, we put forth a novel public verification AUDITING scheme with constant communication cost based on self-certified signature scheme. Our AUDITING scheme can provide constant communication size, efficient computation performance as well as low storage overhead. And the security of the scheme is tightly related to the FI problem of the bilinear map and the inversion of hash function. Finally, we extend the above auditing protocol into multi-user setting to support data integrity checking in the multi-user setting.
